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INADVERTENT WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE BY DISCLOSURE OF
DOCUMENTS: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
ALAN

J.

MEESE*

"Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely-may be
pursued too keenly-may cost too much." 1
INTRODUCTION
Like all evidentiary privileges, the attorney-client privilege exists in derogation of the truth. 2 The protection of communications
between attorney and client produces general and intangible benefits
at the expense of concrete and specific harms. 3 This tension between
the specific and the general, the known and the unknown, has produced hostility toward the privilege among judges and scholars. 4
This hostility towards the privilege manifests itself in several ways,
including expansive definitions of waiver. 5 Recent case law abounds
A.B., The College of William and Mary in Virginia; J.D., The University of
Chicago. The author, a member of the Virginia Bar, is a Law Clerk to Judge Frank H.
Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for· the Seventh Circuit. Special
thanks to Richard Murphy and Andrew Lee for their valuable comments and to the
John M. Olin Foundation for financial assistance.
1. Pearse v. Pearse, 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (Ch. 1846) (discussing the marriage
privilege), quoted in Note, Developments in the Law of Privileged Communications, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1450 (1985).
2. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). The Court stated that
"[w]hatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for everyman's evidence ...
are in derogation of the search for truth." Id.
3. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961). The treatise stated that "[i]ts benefits [of the privilege] are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction [of truthfinding] is plain and concrete." Id.
4. See Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued; More Disclosure, Less Privilege,
54 COL. L. REV. 51 (1982); M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 64 (1980), cited in Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or Categorical Imperative? 52 U. CoLO. L. REV. 349, 350-51 (1981); C. McCORMICK, LAW OF
EVIDENCE 176 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) (stating that "[l]f one were legislating for a new
commonwealth ... it might be hard to maintain that [the privilege] would facilitate
more than it would obstruct the administration of justice."); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
3, at § 2292, at 554 (recommending "[the privilege] ought to be strictly confined within
the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle."); Note, 98
HARV. L. REV. at 1478-79; Eigenheim Bank v. Halpurn, 598 F. Supp. 988, 991-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (urging "[a] need to limit the scope of the privilege").
5. See Note, Permian Corp. v. United States & The Attorney-Client Privilege for
Corporations: Unjustified Severity on the Issue of Waiver, 77 Nw. L. REV. 223, 231-32
(1982) (noting that hostility towards privilege contributes to an expansive notion of
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with judicial constructions of the waiver prong of the privilege analysis.6 Perhaps the most common form of contested waiver relates to
privileged documents produced during the pretrial discovery process.
To be precise, some courts have held that parties who voluntarily
produce privileged documents during the discovery process waive the
privilege, regardless of whether they intend to do so. 7 Other courts
take less extreme views, holding that the privilege is waived only in
the absence of reasonable precautions to guard against production. 8
Still others hold that a subjective intent to waive is necessary. 9
This Article explores the doctrine of inadvertent waiver and the
three standards governing it: strict responsibility, conduct, and subjective intent. First, the Article takes a brief look at the privilege
and the purpose which it serves, concluding that a narrow focus upon
privacy or confidentiality is misguided. 10 Instead, the attorney-client
privilege is a sort of property right in information which encourages
the flow of information between attorney and client.11
This Article then analyzes the case law surrounding inadvertent
disclosure, providing examples of the three standards mentioned
above. 12 After analyzing the standards applied, the Article examines
the effect of the doctrine upon the policies which the privilege seeks
to implement.l3 The Article questions whether there is any reason to
apply standards of waiver in the document production context which
are different than those applied in other property rights contexts. 14
An economic analysis shows that there is no reason for departing
from the traditional requirement that a waiver be knowing and intentional. The Article then analyzes the effect of the conduct and
strict responsibility standards upon the values facilitated by the privilege as well as the parties to litigation, again using conventional tools
of economic analysis. This analysis reveals that both the conduct and
waiver with respect to communications disclosed to the SEC); Marcus, The Perils of
Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1654 (1986) (concluding
that the judicial attitude toward waiver depends upon attitude toward privilege); Grippanda, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied Waiver Through Inadvertent Disclosure of
Documents, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 525 (1985) (saying that too often courts fail to
acknowledge the benefits of the privilege, leading to an expansive definition of
waiver). See Davidson & Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 64 OR. L. REv.
637, 640-66 (1986) (surveying various forms of waiver).
6. See irifra note 50 and accompanying text.
7. See irifra notes 54-115 and accompanying text.
8. See irifra notes 80-115 and accompanying text.
9. See irifra notes 116-130 and accompanying text.
10. See irifra notes 15-48 and accompanying text.
11. See irifra note 33 and accompanying text.
12. See irifra notes 49-130 and accompanying text.
13. See irifra notes 131-160 and accompanying text.
14. See irifra notes 162-179 and accompanying text.
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strict responsibility approaches impose unwarranted social costs on
attorneys, clients, and society at large.
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the testimonial privileges, dating from the late sixteenth century. 15 It remains the most
entrenched of the evidentiary privileges. 16 Congress has not explicitly adopted this privilege for federal courts; rather, it has directed
the courts to develop various privileges "in light of reason and experience" in those cases in which federal law provides the rule of decisionP Pursuant to this mandate, federal courts have adopted a
common law relating to attorney-client privilege. 18
Federal courts have followed the approach of Dean Wigmore
who stated that the privilege is obtained when eight conditions are
met: 19
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5)
by the client, (6) are at [the client's] instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by [the client] or by the legal
advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. 20
Invocation of the privilege conceals information from the tribunal. Yet, there are offsetting benefits of the privilege. 21 Specifically,
there are two possible purposes for withholding such information
from the court: protecting privacy 22 and encouraging information
15. Note, Developments in the Law of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1450, 1456 (1985); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 559,
560 (1985); Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577); Dennis v. Codrington, 21 Eng.
Rep. 53 (Ch. 1580).
16. E. GREEN & C. NESSON, EVIDENCE 535 (1983).
17. FEo. R. EviD. 501. When state law provides the rule of decision, as in diversity
cases, federal courts apply state privilege law. !d. See Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 598
F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying New York privilege law in diversity action).
18. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v. United States,
425 u.s. 391, 403-14 (1976).
19. E.g., United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1441 (4th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 700 (7th Cir. 1985).
20. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
21. See infra notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text.
22. Note, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 1501-08; Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial
Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J.
613, 651-52 (1976); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in
Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110-11 (1956); Alschuler, The Preservation of
a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or Categorical Imperative?,· 52 U.
CoLO. L. REV. 349, 353-54 (1981); Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: In Search of an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary
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Under a privacy rationale, the purpose of the privilege is to provide the client with a small sphere of autonomy, free from the intervention of an overreaching state. 24 Such an approach ignores any
possible benefits to the legal system from the invocation of the privilege. Instead, a privacy rationale considers the invocation of the privilege as almost a categorical imperative. 25
Courts have rejected the privacy rationale, focusing on the utilitarian, information production approach. 26 Under this approach, the
privilege, which conceals truth from the tribunal, is adopted and protected only insofar as adoption and protection provides independent
benefits to the legal system. 27 Specifically, the privilege is a sort of
property right which encourages the generation of information which
in turn serves the goals of the justice system. By maintaining the
confidentiality of communications between client and attorney, the
privilege encourages clients to tell all to their attorneys. 28 This proSystem, and the Corporate Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 495,
499-513 (1982).
23. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Iriformation, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 309, 356-57; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal
Advice About Iriformation to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability,
102 HARV. L. REV. 567, 570 (1989); Rosenfeld, 33 HASTINGS L.J. at 508-09; Shavell, Legal
Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Corifidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 131-34 (1988); J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, at § 2291, at 554; Note, The Fifth Amendment, The AttorneyClient Privilege, and the Prosecution of White-Collar Crime, 75 VA. L. REV. 1179, 1198
(1989).
24. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 77, at 157 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). The
treatise states that:
[I]t is evident that for many people, judges, lawyers, and laymen, the protection of confidential communications from enforced disclosure has been
thought to represent rights of privacy and security too important to relinquish
to the convenience of litigants. Growing concern in recent times with the increase in official prying and snooping into the lives of private individuals has
reinforced support for the traditional privileges and no doubt aided in the creation of new ones.
!d.
25. Alschuler, 52 U. CoLO. L. REV. at 353-54.
26. See Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 476-81 (1987) (arguing that application of the
privilege to corporations necessarily rejects the privacy rationale).
27. Note, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 1503-05; State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, 193 A.2d
799 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963). The court stated that "[e]ncouraging these communications
is desirable because the communications are necessary for the maintenance of certain
relationships. It is socially desirable to foster the protected relationships because other
beneficial results are achieved, such as the promotion of justice." !d. at 807.
28. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "If such communications
were required to be made the subject of examinations and publication, such enactment
would be a practical prohibition upon professional advice and assistance." United
States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915); J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, at
§ 2290, at 545; C. McCORMICK, supra note 24, § 87, at 175. The Supreme Court has
stated that "[a]s a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information
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vides the legal system with two discrete benefits, depending upon
when the communication is made. 29 Chief Justice Shaw recognized
these benefits over a century ago when he wrote:
This principle we take to be this; that so numerous and complex are the laws by which the rights and duties of citizens
are governed, so important is it that they should be permitted to avail themselves of the superior skill and learning of
[attorneys] both in ascertaining their rights in the country,
and maintaining them most safely in courts ... that the law
has considered it the wisest policy to encourage and sanction
this confidence, by requiring that on such facts the mouth of
the attorney should be for ever sealed. 3 0
Communications made before an alleged wrong allow attorneys
to properly counsel clients in their attempts to obey the law "out in
the country." 31 Communications made after the alleged wrongdoing,
during litigation, help the lawyer guide the client though the labyrinth of the legal system. 32 At common law, courts feared that if
they did not protect such confidences, parties would not even retain
attorneys but would come into court themselves and wreak havoc on
the legal system. 33
Some scholars have suggested that the pre-litigation or planning
justification is a stronger rationale. 34 Specifically, they note that the
generation of such information may not be as useful during litigation
as it is beforehand. Inadvertently produced documents generally fall
into this second, planning category. 35 They are generally letters from
clients to attorneys or other documents produced well before litigacould be more readily obtained from the attorney following disclosure . . . the client
would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403.
29. Note, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 1505.
30. Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416, 422 (1833).
31. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. The Court stated that the attorney-client privilege
"promotes broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of
justice." Id. (emphasis added).
32. One court has stated that "(t]he layman's course through litigation must at
least be evened by the assurance that he may, without penalty, invest his confidence
and confidences in a professional counselor." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 406 F. Supp. 381, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
33. Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, Sage & Co., 5 How. Pr. 254, 258-59 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1851). The court stated that "(i]f the facts thus communicated were liable to be
extorted from the attorney or counsel, suitors would hesitate to employ them, to the
great inconvenience of the court, and obstruction of judicial business." Id. at 258.
34. Kaplow & Shavell, 102 HARV. L. REV. at 568-88; Easterbrook, 1981 SUP. CT.
REV. at 360-65.
35. See, e.g., Parkway Gallery v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 116 F.R.D.
46, 48 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (containing letter from general counsel describing current state
of antitrust resale price maintenance enforcement). See also Manufacturers & Traders
Trust v. Servotronics, Inc. 132 A.D.2d 392, -, 522 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1002 (1987); O'Leary v.
Purcell Co., 108 F.R.D. 641, 643 (M.D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel
Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1954). But see Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi
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tion has begun. Hence, they fall under the strongest justification for
the privilege, a justification upon which this article will now focus.
FOSTERING THE RULE OF LAW
Encouraging open and frank discussion between attorney and client during planning stages fosters the rule of law. 36 The rule of law
requires that individuals be able to understand their rights and duties
and order their lives accordingly. 37 When the rule of law does not
obtain, parties are unable to order their behavior and are thus less
likely to engage in a legally protected activity. 38 Such analysis applies to any society governed by laws. 39 Yet, it has taken on increasing importance for corporations in an administrative state whose
rules are ever-expanding in both reach and complexity. In Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 40 the United States Supreme Court explicitly
recognized this importance, stating that "[i]n light of the vast and
complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modern
corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, 'constantly go to
lawyers to find out how to obey the law' particularly since compliance with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter." 41
Without the confidentiality assured by the privilege, clients face
a difficult dilemma. If they reveal damaging information to their attorney, they increase their chances of future legal battles. Yet, if
they fail to come clean to their advisor, they risk violating the law
and increase the possibility of initiating such a battle in the first
place. Faced with such a choice, clients will certainly provide less inStrauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing some documents which had
been generated during litigation).
36. Note, Developments in the Law of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1450, 1505-08 (1985); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges and the Production of Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 354.
37. F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, 72-87 (1944); J. LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GoVERNMENT §§ 136-37 (2d ed. 1970); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 238 (1971); L.
FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63-64 (1965).
38. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 156-57 (1960); T. RAWLS, supra
note 37, at 235.
39. Over a century before the rise of the modern welfare state with all its attendant complexities, Jeremy Bentham remarked: "The multitude have not leisure for
profoundly studying the laws: they do not possess the capacity for connecting together
distant regulations-they do not understand the technical terms of arbitrary and artificial methods." Bentham, A General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in 3 THE WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 161 (J. Bowring ed. 1843) cited in Note, 98 HARV. L. REV. at
1506.
40. 449 u.s. 383 (1981).
41. Id. at 392 (citations omitted). For earlier statements of similar principles in
the federal courts, see United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir.
1977) (discussing the increased use by a business in seeking advice as to future conduct); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 320-24 (7th Cir. 1963)
(describing the increased use of attorneys by corporate clients).
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formation to their legal advisor than they would given the existence
of the privilege. As a result, individuals and corporations will be less
able to order their lives, engage in legally-protected activity, and will
violate the law more often. 42 Of course, these costs will be offset by
increased truth reaching the tribunal in the case that clients still
choose to consult with attorneys. Yet, less such truth will exist without the privilege than with it. Specifically, in those cases in which
clients refuse to consult an attorney, there will be no story for the
attorney to tell. 43 A small table making this comparison may help
illustrate.
Truth to Tribunal
Privilege Exists:
Zero
No Privilege:
T:+(f)Y

Consultations with Attorney
X
Y=X=Z 44

Thus, in deciding whether to protect such communications, society
must decide whether the loss in communications (Z) and thus the
rule of law, is of lesser or greater value than the increased truth
reaching the tribunal (T). More formally, society should adopt the
privilege if:
+dT(Value of truth)> -dZ(L) (Value of Law Obedience). 45
Here, support for or opposition to the privilege depends upon an impossible empirical guess as to whether, absent the privilege, clients
will still consult their attorneys, provide them with incriminating information, and receive legal advice. 46 History has struck such a balance in favor of the privilege, a judgment reaffirmed by the Upjohn
42. Note, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 1506-07 (discussing social benefits of increased client awareness of legal rights).
43. One commentator has stated that "[b]ecause the same information might not
exist were it not for the privilege, any loss of information when the privilege is upheld
may be more imagined than real." Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers
and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597,610 (1980). See also Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 u.s. 383, 395 (1981).
44. Where X is the number of conversations which would take place with the
privilege, Z is the number of conversations which would be forgone without the
privilege, T is the amount of truth which would reach the tribunal, and T is a positive
function of Y and thus a negative function of Z.
45. Where L is the increase in social welfare resulting from an increase in obedience and understanding of the law derived from a consultation. See generally Note, 98
HARV. L. REV. at 1506-07 (discussing these social benefits).
46. Easterbrook, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. at 361 (describing such analysis as a "stupifying task"); Saltzburg, Corporate Privilege In Shareholder Litigation and Similar Cases:
Garrow revisited, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 822 (1984) (stating that "the adoption of the
privilege represents an educational guess about behavior"); Note 98 HARV. L. REV. at
1474-1480.
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majority. 47 The Court in Upjohn decided that failure to adopt the
privilege would so hinder the rule of law that any loss in truth is
justified. 48
CASE LAW DEALING WITH INADVERTENT WAIVER
In the case of document production, several courts have held that
once a document is produced it loses its privileged status, regardless
of whether the client intended the production to take place. 49 These
doctrines force the client to bear the burden of disclosure, regardless
of whether he intended to waive the privilege. Many times such
"waiver" waives more than the privilege with respect to the documents in question. Courts often hold that the waiver of the privilege
with respect to the document also waives the privilege as to other
matters dealing with the same subject matter. 50 Hence, the inadvertent production of one document may waive the privilege as to all
documents or conversations dealing with a particular subject matter,
greatly increasing the cost of disclosure.
In recent years, federal and state courts have dealt with the issue
of inadvertent waiver with increasing frequency. Typically, a party
has inadvertently produced a document or allowed the opposition to
view it during discovery and is now either seeking its return or refusing to answer a question founded on the document. 51 Unfortunately,
the facts of the cases do not admit of a single generalization in one
crucial respect. To be precise, producing parties do not always allege
that they took reasonable precautions to guard against release of the
document. The lack of such factual uniformity often makes it difficult to determine which standard the court has applied. Specifically,
in those cases in which there are no allegations of care, courts are
able to reach the same result by applying either of two approaches. 52
In such cases, there are no clear holdings; courts often appear to be
applying a mesh of the approaches .. Commentators, however, have
divided these approaches into three categories: strict responsibility,
conduct, and subjective intent.53
47. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402.
48. /d. at 395.
49. See supra notes 54-115 and accompanying text.
50. See Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank of Washington, 103 F.R.D. 52,
63 (D.D.C. 1984); Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 107 N.M. 679, -, 763 P.2d 1144,
1152-53 (N.M. 1988).
51. See, e.g., International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D.
445, 446 (D. Mass. 1988) (dealing with production during discovery); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 547 (D.D.C. 1970).
52. See, e.g., W.R. Grace v. Pullman, 446 F. Supp. 771 (W.O. Okla. 1976); Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 546.
53. Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney Client
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STRICT RESPONSIBILITY APPROACH

The traditional approach, 54 favored by Dean Wigmore, is the socalled strict responsibility approach. 55 Under this approach, any production of documents waives the privilege, whether or not that production is inadvertent. Some courts purport to apply such a test. For
instance, in Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 56
the plaintiff's attorney inadvertently turned over a privileged letter
to the defendant. 57 Defendant questioned plaintiff's attorney about
material contained in the letter. 58 The attorney refused to answer
the questions, citing the attorney-client privilege. 59 The defendant
sought an order compelling an answer.so
The court ordered the attorney to answer the question. 61 Holding that the privilege was waived, the court appeared to follow a
strict approach, stating that "the plaintiff turned over to his attorney
the documents to be produced. This letter was among them. The
Court will not look behind this objective fact to determine whether
the plaintiff really intended to have the letter examined."62
A few courts have followed the rule of Underwater Storage. For
instance, in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 63 the plaintiff produced privileged documents during discovery. 64 Later the plaintiff
sought an order returning the documents. 65 The court refused to issue the order.66 In so doing, the court cited Underwater Storage, stating that "[o]ne cannot produce documents and later assert a privilege
which ceases to exist because of the production."67
Privilege, 82 MICH. L. REV. 598, 607-19 (1983) (discussing "traditional," "reasonable
precautions," and "voluntary disclosure approaches"); Davidson & Voth, Waiver of the
Attorney Client Privilege: The Necessity of Intent to Waive the Privilege in Inadver·
tent Disclosure Cases, 18 PAC. L.J. 59, 70-83 (1986) (discussing strict responsibility,
analysis of the circumstances, and intent approaches).
54. Some commentators have referred to this approach as the traditional approach. See Note, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 607. See also Manufacturers & Traders Trust
Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 392, -, 522 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004 (1987). Note, however, that the earliest case to deal with the issue adopted a conduct approach. See
United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
55. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290, at 636 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
56. 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970).
57. ld. at 547-48.
58. Id. at 547.
59. Id.
60. ld.
61. ld.
62. ld. at 549.
63. 446 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
64. ld. at 773.
65. Id.
66. ld. at 775.
67. Id. (citing Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549).
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Both Underwater Storage and Grace are generally treated as
strict responsibility cases, i.e. relying on the so-called traditional approach.68 Yet, as some commentators have noted, these two cases are
not strong precedents for such a proposition. 69 Specifically, neither
case contained an allegation of reasonable care on the part of the producing party. These two cases mirror others in which the courts used
the language of strict responsibility, but faced no allegation of reasonable care. 70 In fact, the Grace court relied upon the lack of precautions in reaching its decision stating, "[i]n the instant case, Defendant
Pullman voluntarily produced the documents almost four months after a Request for Production was served on it. Notwithstanding the
apparently voluminous amount of discovery involved, said Defendant
could have taken necessary steps to remove purportedly privileged
documents prior to permitting discovery." 71
Indeed, in In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transport, 72
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit cast some doubt on the strict responsibility approach of Underwater Storage. Specifically, the court noted that "[p]erhaps this latter
rule [the traditional approach] should not be strictly applied to all
cases of unknown or inadvertent disclosure; this, however, is not a
case where any such exception would be appropriate. Here, the disclosure cannot be viewed as having been [totally] inadvertent in all
cases." 73 Hence, these two cases, as well as others, are in a sort of
twilight zone. 74 While these courts purport to use a traditional, strict
approach, their results could be achieved by means of a reasonable
care standard.
There is one true strict responsibility case: International Digital
Systems Corp. v. Digital Equipment Corp. 75 In this case, the court
considered a claim of inadvertent waiver. 76 In the opinion, the magistrate considered all possible standards. 77 After carefully examining
the precautions taken by the producing party and pointing out inadequacies, the court rejected such an approach. Magistrate Callings
stated, "I do not find application of this doctrine to 'inadvertent' dis68. See, e.g., Note, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 607.
69. See, e.g., Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied Waiver Through Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 519-21 (1985).
70. See Chubb, 103 F.R.D. at 63-64; Rockland Indus., Inc. v. Frank Kasmir Assoc's.,
470 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fuller, 695 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985).
71. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775.
72. 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
73. Id. at 675.
74. See, e.g., Chubb, 103 F.R.D. at 63-64; Rockland Indus., 470 F. Supp. at 1176.
75. 120 F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass. 1988).
76. /d. at 446.
77. /d. at 448-49.
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closure
particularly useful. . . . I see little benefit to doing a
painstaking evaluation of the precautions taken by plaintiff's counsel
when it is noted that the whole basis for the privilege is to maintain
the confidentiality of the document." 78 The court, citing Underwater
Storage, then rejected the producing party's privilege request. 79
CONDUCT APPROACH

The earliest modern case to deal with the inadvertent waiver
problem was United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co. 80 In Kelsey,
the corporation in an antitrust action allowed the government to inspect its files, which contained privileged documents. 81 Later, when
the government sought an admission that certain documents were
genuine, the defendant refused, citing the privilege. 82 The court ordered the production of the documents, holding that the privilege
had been waived by production.B3
In ordering the production of the documents, the ·court emphasized that they were no longer confidential because of the initial inspection by the government, stating that "the context in which the
rule is intended to serve, the protection of confidential communications, is no longer present." 84 The court also questioned the intent to
maintain confidentiality by noting that the defendant had made "no
special effort to preserve them in segregated files with special protections. . . . One measure of their continuing confidentiality is the degree of care exhibited in their keeping."B5
Several courts have built upon the idea of using precautions to
measure intent. 86 Others have adopted the so-called "conduct" standard without claiming that conduct is an indicium of intent. 87 These
courts have adopted what one commentator has referred to as a conduct standard. 88 Under this standard, courts treat a party's conduct
78. !d. at 449.
79. !d. at 449-50 (citing Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549).
80. 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
81. !d. at 462.
82. !d.
83. ld. at 464-65.
84. !d. at 465.
85. !d.
86. See, e.g. Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb. 1985)
(finding that the procedural screening involved showed production was not a deliberate act); Parkway v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 116 F.R.D. 46, 46 (M.D.N.C.
1987) (holding that "failure to take action and precautions will be imputed to the client
in determining his intent or understanding with respect to confidentiality").
' 87. See, e.g., Hartman, 107 N.M. at 679, 763 P.2d at 1144.
88. Grippando, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. at 513.
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as the best indicator of whether there was intent to waive. 89 In
Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 90 for instance, the court noted that
"mere inadvertence" would not constitute a waiver. 91 The corporate
defendants had accidentally produced a document in response to a
discovery request. 92 In determining whether the document should
have been returned, the court looked closely at the reason for the
"inadvertent" production. 93 After finding that the document was
only one of thirty requested and that it had been identified as privilege in earlier litigation, the judge held the privilege to be waived,
stating "I simply cannot agree with defendants that their conduct
constituted mere inadvertence. The procedure followed by defendants with regard to maintaining the confidentiality of this document
was 'so lax, careless, inadequate or indifferent to consequences as to
constitute a waiver.' " 9 4
While Eigenheim appears to adopt a conduct standard, it did little to clarify the criteria used to determine if the standard is met.
Other cases have done so. 95 For instance, in Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,96 the Supreme Court of New Mexico considered and
adopted a conduct standard. 97 In so doing, the court listed five factors which should assist a court in determining whether an inadvertently produced document should retain its privilege. 98 In the court's
words:
[There are] five factors which should assist a court in determining whether a document has lost its privilege: (1) The
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in view of the extent of the document production; (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the
extent of the disclosure; (4) any delay and measures taken to
rectify the disclosures; (5) whether the overriding interests
of justice would be served by relieving a party of its error. 99
The court went on to note that "when measuring El Paso's conduct
by these factors, we find its conduct lacking." 100 Several courts have
adopted a similar approach, looking at the conduct of the producing
89.
90.
ant to a
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

ld. at 513-15.
598 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (interpreting New York privilege law pursudiversity action).
ld. at 991-92.
Id. at 989.
ld. at 990-91.
ld. at 991.
See infra notes 96-116 and accompanying text.
107 N.M. 679, 763 P.2d 1144 (1988).
Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 1152.
Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 1152.
Id. (citing Parkway, 116 F.R.D. at 50).
Hartman, 107 N.M. at -, 763 P.2d 1152.

1990]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

525

party as an indicator of the party's intent to maintain
confidentiality.101
The conduct standard has two broad components. Courts first
look to the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent disclosure in the first place. 102 This initial inquiry is three-pronged. The
first prong examines actions taken before litigation. Clients themselves can segregate privileged and non-privileged documents at the
document generation stage before litigation actually takes place.103
The second prong of analysis applies once litigation begins. Parties
may take care at this production stage so that privileged documents
are not produced. 104 In determining whether parties have taken
proper precautions during the production stage, courts look to several
factors. 105 Courts usually examine the screening procedure used. 106
Parties may screen documents one by one, removing those privileged
from the discovery process. 107 Alternatively, parties can prepare documents for production, compiling an index as they go and removing
privileged documents after all the documents have been prepared. 108
Parties may also adopt more than one level of review. 109 Courts
often examine the competence of the screeners, asking whether they
were capable of distinguishing privileged from non-privileged documents.110 Precautions are more likely to be found reasonable if an
101. Prebilt Corp. v. Preway, Inc., No. 87-7132 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1988) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Kanter v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 803, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 810 (1988); Servotronics, 132 A.D.2d at 392, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 999; Liggett Group,
Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205 (M.D.N.C. 1986); Marathon
Oil, 109 F.R.D. at 12.
102. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A. Inc. v. Levi Corp., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating "Levi apparently had no practice of designation of confidential
documents at the time of origination").
.
103. Prebilt, No. 87-7132 at 7-8; Ranney-Brown Distribs., Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 465.
104. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105; Marathon Oil, 109 F.R.D. at 21; National
Heluim v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 612, 615 (1979); Hartman, 107 N.M. at-, 763 P.2d
at 1152.
105. For a discussion of these factors, see Note, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 619-23. See also
Developments in the Law, New York Recognizes an Exception to Waiver of AttorneyClient Privilege for Fraudulent Voluntary Disclosure of Privileged Documents, 62 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 752, 757-58 (1985) (discussing factors courts should consider in evaluating reasonableness of precautions).
106. One court has formulated the test as "a good faith, sufficiently careful, effort
to winnow a relatively small volume of privileged materials from a very large number
of documents." National Helium, 219 Ct. Cl. at 615.
107. Servotronics, 132 A.D.2d at -, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004-1005; Lois Sportswear, 104
F.R.D. at 105.
108. International Digital Sys., 120 F.R.D. at 446-47.
109. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 573 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing IBM's use of two levels of screening during massive expedited discovery);
Parkway, 116 F.R.D. at 51 (stating that "when large numbers of documents are involved, a post-designation review may be necessary).
110. Kanter, 206 Cal. App. 3d at -, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 819; Servotronics, 132 A.D.2d
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attorney, rather than a paralegal, did the screening. 111 In the third
step to determine "reasonableness," courts ask how many documents
were actually produced. 112 If a large percentage of those produced
are privileged, the courts are likely to find that the precautions were
unreasonable. 113
The second component of the conduct analysis deals with actions
taken once documents have been released. Specifically, courts often
ask how long an interval existed between the time of release and the
time when the releasing party sought return of the documents.U 4
Such an inquiry says nothing about the care taken before the release;
instead, it looks at action taken afterwards. When producing parties
have waited a substantial period before attempting to retrieve a document, courts are more hostile to claims that there was no intent to
waive. 115
SUBJECTIVE INTENT APPROACH11 6

Some courts have rejected the conduct and strict responsibility
approaches, adopting the so-called subjective intent approach.l1 7 The
at-, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005. C.f. Parkway, 116 F.R.D. at 51 (suggesting that counsel, not
independent copier service, copy documents).
111. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
112. See Parkway, 116 F.R.D. at 51 (stating that "[a] large number of inadvertent
disclosures in comparison to the number of disclosures shows lax, careless, and inadequate procedures"); Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105 (finding no waiver when only 22
of 16,000 requested documents were privileged).
113. Marathon Oil, 109 F.R.D. at 21; Kanter, 206 Cal. App. 3d at -, 253 Cal. Rptr.
at 819; Prebilt, No. 87-7132 at 7.
114. Serootronics, 132 A.D.2d at-, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005; In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
115. See Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d at 674; Hariford, 109 F.R.D. at 332 (suggesting a quick rectification of error militates against waiver); Parkway, 116 F.R.D. at
51.
116. The term "subjective intent" is taken from the opinion in Kanter, 206 Cal.
App. 3d at -, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16, which used this term to describe the standard
adopted in Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982). In
Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Necessity of Intent to Waive the Privilege in
Inadvertent Disclosure Cases, 18 PAC. L.J. 59 (1986), the author refused to adopt the
term "subjective intent," fearing that such a term would refer to intent at the time of
the controversy, as opposed to the time of the release. In both theory and practice, it is
not difficult to distinguish between subjective intent at the time of release and
subjective intent at the time of controversy. This article uses the term in the former
sense.
117. Commentators are split as to whether there is a difference between a conduct
approach and an intent approach. Compare, Grippando, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. at 513-15
(placing cases such as Mendenhall under the conduct rubric) with Comment, 18 PAC.
L.J. at 83 (placing cases such as Mendenhall in a separate "intent" category). The
Mendenhall case is clearly distinguishable in a real sense from so-called conduct cases.
In Mendenhall, the court explicitly noted that negligence by an attorney could not
waive the privilege. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955.
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most prominent subjective intent ca5e is Mendenhall v. BarberGreene Co. 118 In Mendenhall, the producing party's attorney provided the opponent's counsel with several files. 119 No action was
taken to cull privileged documents from these files. 120 The receiving
party then moved for production of four privileged documents, claiming that the allowance of inspection had waived the privilege.121 The
court denied the motion, despite a belief that the producing attorney
may have been negligent. 122 In so holding, the court adopted unusually strong language against a conduct approach:
We are taught from first year law school that waiver imports
the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right.' Inadvertent production is the antithesis of that concept.... Mendenhall's lawyer (not trial counsel) might well
have been negligent in failing to cull the files of the letters
before turning over the files. But if we are serious about the
attorney-client privilege and its relation to the client's welfare, we should require more than such negligence by counsel before the client can be deemed to have given up the
privilege.123
Several courts dealing with the problem of inadvertent waiver
have cited Mendenhall ;124 producing parties have sought its support.125 Yet, few courts have adopted its reasoning. At least one
court has misinterpreted Mendenhall ;126 most have explicitly rejected it. 127 Indeed, only two opinions have adopted Mendenhall's
logic. 128 One opinion came from a magistrate in the northern district
of Illinois, the same court which decided Mendenhall. 129 The other
opinion came from an appeals court in Michigan, which was apparently unaware of the Mendenhall decision. 130
118. 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
119. /d. at 952.
120. /d. at 954.
121. /d. at 955.
122. /d.
123. /d. (citations omitted).
124. Hartman, 107 N.M. at-, 763 P.2d at 1152; Hariford, 109 F.R.D. at 329; Kanter,
206 Cal. App. 3d at 803, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 816; Prebilt, No. 87-7132 at 11; O'Leary v. Purcell Co., 108 F.R.D. 641, 646 (M.D.N.C. 1985); Marathon Oil, 109 F.R.D. at 21.
125. See, e.g., Hartman, 107 N.M. at -, 763 P.2d at 1152; Hariford, 109 F.R.D. at
329.
126. See O'Leary, 108 F.R.D. at 646 (stating that Mendenhall adopts conduct analysis); Marathon Oil, 109 F.R.D. at 21 (purporting to adopt Mendenhall but still engaging
in conduct analysis).
127. See Hartman, 107 N.M. at -, 763 P.2d at 1152; Hartford, 109 F.R.D. at 329;
Kanter, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 803, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
128. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
129. In re Sealed Case, 120 F.R.D. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that the privilege is
not waived by inadvertent production).
130. Sterling v. Keidan, 162 Mich. App. 88, 412 N.W.2d 255 (1987) (finding waiver
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AN EVALUATION OF THE CASE LAW
There are three anomalies apparent in the case law. The first is
its reliance upon the confidentiality (privacy) component of the privilege. As noted earlier, 131 the United States Supreme Court has
adopted the information production justification of the privilege and
has said nothing about privacy. Several courts, especially those that
have adopted a form of the strict responsibility approach, have rejected the information production justification approach and adopted
a privacy rationale in the waiver context. 132 When parties have inadvertently released documents (or disclosed their contents), these
courts place great emphasis upon the fact that the documents no
longer possess their confidentiality. This is why some courts have
held that the question of waiver will be decided with reference to
whether the receiving party has learned the "gist" of their
contents. 133
The second anomaly in this context is the various definitions of
waiver and intent applied to these cases. As noted earlier, the
Supreme Court has adopted the information production rationale for
the privilege. 134 Such a rationale creates a property right in information in order to foster the production of such information. It seems
that, in a property rights context, the doctrine of inadvertent waiver
is a misnomer. The court in Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 135 of
course, took the traditional approach to waiver; in order to waive the
privilege, a party must intend to do so. 136 Many courts pay lip service
to such a standard. However, as we have seen, these courts have
adopted a strange definition of intent. 137 Specifically, the majority of
only when producing party consciously releases a document which it knows might be
privileged, deciding to take the risk). The court stated that the law requires that, "an
implied waiver be judged by standards as stringent as for a 'true waiver.' " /d. at 162
- , 412 N.W.2d at 260.
131. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
132. Prebilt Corp. v. Preway, Inc., No. 87-7132 at 5-6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); International Digital Sys. Corp v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 449-50 (D. Mass. 1988); Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National
Bank of Washington, 103 F.R.D. 52, 63, 67 (D.D.C. 1984); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes
Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954); Ranney-Brown Distribs., Inc. v. E.T.
Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 6, (S.D. Ohio 1977); Underwater Storage Inc. v.
United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970).
133. Prebilt, No. 87-7132 at 6; Chubb, 103 F.R.D. at 63; Ranney-Brown, 75 F.R.D. at
7 (scheduling a hearing to determine if confidentiality was lost). See also Parkway
Gallery v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 116 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (M.D.N.C. 1987)
(holding when an opponent has learned contents of the documents, a very strong
showing with regard to other factors is required to defeat waiver).
134. See supra note 47.
135. 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
136. /d. at 955.
137. See Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D.
Ill. 1981) (holding that failure to shred the documents before disposing of them consti-
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courts infer intent from the precautions taken by the producing
party. 138 As the court in Prebilt Corp. v. Preway, Inc. 139 noted, courts
should ask whether the "precautions taken by [the producing party]
were ... sufficient to protect their interest."140 At first glance, this
may seem sensible. However, it must be recalled that it does not answer the central question, to wit, why should producing parties have
to protect their interest in the first place, when their interest could
be protected just as easily by requiring the receiving party to return
inadvertently produced documents?
The third anomaly within these cases is the tri-level of standards
applied. These three standards, of course, correspond to the three
standards of care which may or may not impose liability in tort: intent, negligence, and strict liability. While commentators split over
the utility of the reasonable precautions and the intent test,l 41 no
commentator, save Wigmore, 142 supports the strict responsibility approach.143 Those commentators who favor a conduct approach over a
strict responsibility approach provide little basis for their preferences.144 One commentator simply notes that precautions are a good
indicator of intent. 145 Another commentator claims that a conduct
approach is more predictable than the strict responsibility approach.146 No commentator has explained the effect of the possible
standards upon the production of information sought by the privituted an intent to waive), cited in Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the
Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1618 n.70 (1986).
138. See, e.g., Prebilt, No. 87-7132 at 7.
139. No. 87-7132 at 5-6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, dist file).
140. /d. at 7.
141. See Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Necessity of Intent to Waive the
Privilege in Inadvertent Disclosure Cases, 18 PAC. L.J. 59, 81-82 (1986) (advocating subjective intent standard); Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied Waiver
Through Inadvertant Disclosure of Documents, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 523-25 (1984)
(advocating conduct approach); Davidson & Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 64 OR. L. REV. 637, 651 (1986) (favoring subjective intent standard, except in cases
in which the receiving party changes position based upon reliance on privileged document); Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 82 MICH. L. REV. 598, 616 (1983) (favoring reasonable precautions approach).
142. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
143. Note, 82 Mich. L. Rev. at 598 (conduct standard); Grippando, 39 U. MIAMI L.
REV. at 511 (conduct standard); Developments in the Law, New York Recognizes an
Exception to Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege for Fraudulent Voluntary Disclosure
of Privileged Documents, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 752, 758 n.33 (1985) (appearing to reject
conduct standard except in cases of reliance by receiving party); Comment, 18 PAC. L.
REV. at 93 (subjective intent); Davidson & Voth, 64 OR. L. REV. at 644-45 (arguing
waiver should be limited to cases in which adverse party changes position in reliance).
144. See in.fra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
145. Note, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 624.
146. Grippando, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. at 524. Such an assertion is but a canard.
Surely a strict responsibility approach is more predictable than a conduct approach. If
you produce, you lose.
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lege. 147 More important, no court has explained why courts should
import tort liability standards into the law of waiver. The court in
Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc. 148 provided
some insight for this reasoning:
We reject the traditional approach, however, because it rests
on the faulty and unrealistic premise that the only interest
protected by the attorney-client privilege is secrecy.... The
fact that information is publicly available does not necessar. ily make it admissible in evidence. Moreover, although confidentiality can never be restored to a document already
disclosed, a court can repair much of the damage done by
disclosure by preventing or restricting the use of the document at trial. 149
From the client's perspective, there is more damage to disclosure
than the breach of confidentiality. Disclosure before the tribunal
will have adverse effects on litigation. Clients who face this possibility are less likely to consult their attorneys in the first place. 150
The first anomaly should not be of concern. The court in Upjohn
Co. v. United States 151 necessarily rejected a privacy approach, 152 and
courts invoking such an approach fly in the face of that decision. The
last two anomalies are of concern, and a brief analogy will highlight
the reason for such concern. Suppose that Ed leaves his house and
negligently leaves his door unlocked. Sally enters his house and
removes Ed's collection of baseball cards. 153 Ed returns but does not
realize that his cards are missing. Once he realizes that they are
missing, he brings suit against Sally alleging tortious conversion of
his cards. At trial, Sally admits the conversion but pleads a defense
of contributory negligence. By leaving the door unlocked, she says,
147. See generally Marcus, 84 MICH. L. REV. at 1609-17 (noting some effects of the
traditional (strict responsibility) approach, without discussing conduct approach).
148. 132 A.D.2d 392, 522 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1987).
149. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 392, -,
522 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004 (1987).
150. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
151. 449 u.s. 383 (1981).
152. See Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 476-81 (1987) (suggesting that the extension of
privilege to corporations involves a rejection of the privacy approach).
153. Of course, parties who receive inadvertently produced documents are not burglars; they are more akin to "finders." This distinction is irrelevant to the analysis
here. Suppose Ed had negligently left his baseball cards at Sally's house. Under the
law of finders, Sally would be liable for conversion if she did not return the cards. See
J. 0UKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 4, 6 (2d ed. 1988); P. GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 23 (1984). Indeed, knowing retention of a chattel without reasonable efforts to
contact the true owner subjects one to penal sanctions in some states. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 485 (West 1988).
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Ed manifested an intent to waive the right to his baseball cards.
What result?
Sally loses, of course. Negligent failure to guard against theft
does not waive a property right. It is hornbook law that contributory
negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort. 154 Allowing such a
defense would make little sense as it would shift the burden of precautions onto the party least able to bear them. It is certainly less
expensive for Sally to fail to enter Ed's house than it is for Ed to
make sure that he always locks his door. 155 As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently noted in a related
context:
The best solution is for people not to harm others intentionally, not for potential victims to take elaborate precautions
against such depredations. If the victims' failure to take precautions were a defense, they would incur costs to take more
precautions (and these costs are a form of loss these victims
would feel in every case, even if the tort does not occur). 156
The burglar cannot escape because the victim left his door unlocked. Nor can a finder refuse to return a lost watch because the
loser was careless.157 So too, a party should not be able to retain
privileged documents because their owner was careless in producing
them. Absent subjective intent to waive, parties should retain their
property right in information. At first glance, determining such intent is difficult. 158 Who knows what the party was thinking at the
moment of production? Who wants to waste judicial resources finding out?
Such criticisms miss the mark. A subjective intent test should
not focus on a person's state of mind at the time of production. Because production is inadvertent, ex hypothesi, a party can have no intent about the document in question.l 59 Instead, such a test should
focus upon the party's intent at the time he is alerted to the fact of
production. In the same way that rules of tort law force parties into
154. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 65, at 462 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 481, 482 (1965).
155. See generally W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 162-65 (1987).
156. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 528 (7th
Cir. 1985) (holding that under the Federal Securities Laws, contributory negligence is
no defense in an action under Rule 10(B)(5)).
157. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
158. Comment, 18 PAC. L. J. at 83 (arguing that the definition of intent used in
these cases is unclear).
159. Marcus, 84 MICH. L. REV. at 1634 (pointing out that "[in such cases] there was
probably not only no intent to waive, but not even an intent to deliver the materials to
the opponent").
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voluntary exchange transactions, 160 so too should the law of inadvertent waiver force the receiving party to alert the producer to the fact
of production and obtain a waiver at that time. 161
This analogy points to a more basic problem with requiring precautions for document releases. Specifically, what harm is there to
releasing a document? At first glance, there appears to be none. Yet,
the courts apparently contemplate two types of harm: frustrated reliance by the opposition and loss of truth in the adversary process.
Both of these harms may justify departing from a subjective intent
standard. This Article now examines each justification in turn.
RELIANCE

Some courts have suggested that a release of privileged documents may result in reliance by adverse parties. 162 According to
these courts, requiring a return of documents after such reliance
takes place frustrates the expectations of the opposing party. 163 Routine return of documents which have been produced and relied upon
will do more than frustrate reliance, it will create uncertainty in the
litigation process, forcing parties to overinvest in the production of
information. 164 A party who does not know which documents he
may introduce at trial is likely to spend extra resources seeking information which he would not need if the privileged documents were
available. For this reason, courts look to the interval of time between
when a document is produced and when its return is sought in determining whether the privilege has been waived.
An example of such a problem may be helpful. Suppose that the
producing party (a defendant) inadvertently produces a privileged
document in January. The document contains information useful to
the plaintiff's case, obviating the need for further investigation of a
particular matter. The plaintiff thus plans to use the document at
trial and concentrates on seeking evidence to prove other elements.
Eight months later, defendant seeks to introduce the document at
trial. Plaintiff objects, claiming that it is protected by privilege.
What result?
It seems clear that the privilege should be lost. Plaintiff has re160. W. Landes and R. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1981 International Review of Law and Economics 127, 142-43.
161. See irifra note 176 and accompanying text.
162. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672, 675
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Servotronics, 132 A.D.2d at -, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
163. Davidson & Voth, 64 OR. L. REV. at 644-45; Note, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 623.
164. C.f. First Wisconsin Mortgage v. First Wisconsin Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 174
(E.D. Wis. 1980) (holding privilege not waived when producing party gained no advantage from production).
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lied upon the availability of the document and has made his information investment decisions accordingly. Refusal to admit the
document now can only result in unfair surprise, or a further delay,
as plaintiff seeks information elsewhere. Indeed, it seems possible
that the defendant has used the disclosure strategically.165 By releasing the document and seeking to recall it, defendant could be hoping
to induce such reliance in hopes of frustrating it later. As the court
noted in In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation :166
[I]t would be unfair and unrealistic now to permit the privilege's assertion as to these documents which have been thoroughly examined and used by the government for several
years. The Government attorneys' minds cannot be expunged, the grand jury is familiar with the documents, and
various witnesses' testimony regarding the papers has been
heard. 167
The law contains an analogy for such a situation. Specifically,
one thinks of property law and the law of adverse possession. One
illustration is a variation on the above hypothetical. Assume that instead of taking Ed's baseball cards, Sally simply moves into the
house. Ed stays away for twenty years. Sally's possession of the
house is (1) actual, (2) open and notorious, (3) exclusive, (4) continuous, and (5) hostile and under claim of right. 168 Upon his return, Ed
seeks to eject Sally from the land. What result? Most probably Ed's
suit would be barred by a statute of limitations, a statute designed to
implement the law of adverse possession. 169 This result would obtain
regardless of Sally's subjective state of m'ind. 170 Such a result serves
two purposes. 171 First, it protects Sally's reliance interest; second, it
encourages the productive activities in which she is engaged. 172 In
165. See Marcus, 84 MICH. L. REV. at 1636 (stating that "if unintended delivery of
privileged material could always be taken back ... there could be continual uncertainty about whether privilege would actually be asserted as to items produced in discovery, a prospect that could disrupt trial preparation").
166. 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
167. /d. at 675 (citations omitted).
168. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 153, at 100 (2d ed. 1988).
169. ld. at 87. The law of adverse possession rarely exists as such. Instead, it takes
the form of limitations of actions for ejectment. See id.
170. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1122, 1123 n.8 (1984).
171. See, Comment, Compensation for the Involuntary Transfer of Property Between Private Parties: Application of a Liability Rule to the Law of Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 758, (1984). Two other purposes served by the doctrine of
adverse possession, "the development of otherwise idle property and to grant title in
the equitable owner of the land ... [derive from] the principles of economic efficiency
and fairness." ld. at 772.
172. For example, as the court stated in LaFrombois v. Jackson, 8 Law. 589 (N.Y.
1826):
But for the intervention of the statute, [barring an action for ejectment] there
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the same way, the receiving party in document production claims a
sort of adverse possession in the privileged document. Hence, there
seems to be some sense in courts looking at the length of time between production and the time when return is sought. Some commentators, otherwise hostile to the doctrine of inadvertent waiver,
have supported such a test. 173
Closer analysis reveals that these commentators, and the courts
with which they agree, are wrong. First, the example probably misstates the law of adverse possession. Contrary to conventional statements of hornbook law, courts do look to the possessing party's state
of mind in determining whether to bar an action by an actual
owner. 174 It is true that defendants in ejectment actions need not
specifically plead and prove subjective good faith. 175 Yet, one commentator noted that "the cases do clearly show that the trespasser
who knows that he is trespassing stands lower in the eyes of the
law." 176 This examination of subjective intent may make little sense
in many adverse possession cases. Take our example above. Even if
Sally knew that the land was not hers, the cost (to her) of determining ownership of the land was quite high. Further, Ed is probably in
a good position to know whether someone else is occupying his land.
Hence, placing the loss on Ed seems to make sense, because he is better able to notify Sally that her reliance will be for naught.
Whatever the merits of examining subjective intent under the
law of adverse possession, such an approach is eminently sound in
our cases of claimed reliance upon a document. If a receiving party
knows that the document is privileged, the cost of notifying the producing party and inquiring about subjective waiver is nearly zero.
This differs greatly from the case of adverse possession in which
Sally, though knowing she is trespassing, has no idea who owns the
land. Conversely, in document production, once the document leaves
the hands of the producing party, that party has no means of deterwould be no end to the revival of dormant and antiquated titles, and many an
honest citizen, who now, by its benignant operation, enjoys in security the few
acres his industry has acquired, and which have been improved by his labour,
and enriched by the "sweat of his brow," would be driven from his home by
an enemy, more insidious and more destructive to the peace of the community
than an invading army.
/d. at 616.
173. Davidson & Voth, 64 OR. L. REV. at 644-45 (advocating that the principle of
waiver be limited to cases in which adversaries have changed their position in reliance
upon the evidentiary availability of a privileged document). See also Developments, 62
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. at 758 n. 33.
174. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 332
(1983).
175. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 153, at 94-95; RESTATEMENT (2D) OF
PROPERTY § 458 (1944); Helmholz, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. at 332.
176. Helmholz, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. at 332.
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mining that it has been lost. Put another way, the receiving party is
in a much better position to avoid a loss from reliance, once the document has been produced. 177 Further, the receiving party will always
subjectively know that the document is privileged. It is difficult to
see how a party can claim to have relied upon a document without
carefully scrutinizing it. Reliance itself is certain to reveal the privileged nature of the document. Once such a revelation occurs, the receiving party is in an excellent position to notify the producing party
about the privileged nature of the document and seek a knowing
waiver. At the time such a notification takes place, the receiving
party has yet to rely upon the availability of the document in deciding whether to gather more information. Hence, prompt notification
of the producing party will not frustrate any reliance on the part of
the receiving party.
LOSS OF TRUTH

The second form of harm against which departure from an intent standard guards is the loss of truth suffered by the adversary
process. By failing to take proper precautions, divulging parties allow
documents to come into the adversary process. Then, after the truth
has come out, the document returns to the owner, essentially destroying truth. Adopting a strict responsibility approach causes parties to take care, generating fewer documents in the first place. 178
This also reduces the number of false productions. Further, when
such documents are produced, the documents remain before the tribunal, greasing the wheels of the judicial process. Adopting a conduct approach forces parties to take care, reducing the amount of
documents originally produced. 179
There is, of course, something wrong with this view. The fact
that a document has changed hands twice does not reduce the
amount of truth reaching the tribunal any more than the failure to
release it in the first place. Further, the very existence of the attorney-client privilege contemplates the concealment of truth. As noted
earlier, 180 the attorney-client privilege exists because of an empirical
estimate that its benefits outweigh its costs, i.e., that a failure to protect the privilege will result in greater harm than that which results
from the reduction of truth flowing to the tribunal. There is no
doubt that the loss of truth is a harm, but the existence of the privi177. See Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d at 674 (discussing that upon receipt of
privileged documents Antitrust Division promptly notified producing party which explicitly stated that it intended to disclose documents).
178. See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 80-116 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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lege manifests a decision that this harm cannot be eliminated without
creating more. Is there any reason to believe that a strict responsibility or conduct approach to the inadvertant production of documents
will eliminate this harm without eliminating the benefits of the privilege? It would seem not; documents are simply another form of communication covered by the privilege. Their protection follows simply
from principles established long ago at common law. Failure to protect documents by adopting loose standards of waiver would seem to
violate the solid support of the privilege established in Upjohn.
EFFECT UPON VALUES BEHIND THE PRIVILEGE
Thus far, this Article has suggested that the inadvertent production of a document causes no harm to the legal system above and beyond that already contemplated by the attorney-client privilege.
Further, the Article has suggested that there is no reason to adopt a
standard of intent different from that employed in other property
rights contexts. Yet, as already noted, most courts do not use a subjective intent approach. Instead, they use either a conduct or a strict
responsibility standard. Below, this Article examines the effect
which each of these standards will have upon the values supporting
the privilege.
STRICT RESPONSIBILITY APPROACH

Under a strict responsibility approach, the privilege is conclusively waived with respect to all privileged documents which are produced.181 Hence, a party who wishes to communicate with his
attorney in writing faces some chance that such communications, if
they survive until the discovery stage, will find their way into the litigation process. Indeed, absent any precautions, this probability seems
quite high, especially given the existence of an opponent skillful at
manipulating the discovery process.
Here, a producing party is akin to an individual facing the prospect of strict liability for injuries that he causes. Such a party could
react in two ways. The client could take care that such documents,
once generated, never reach the other party. 182 As noted earlier,
there are two ways of preventing these documents from being circulated. Clients may either segregate privileged and nonprivileged doc~
uments in their own files before litigation actually begins or they
may take care at the document production stage to prevent the divul181. See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text.
182. SeeR. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 161 (3d ed. 1986); W. LANDES
& R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 66-67 (1987); S. SHAVELL; Eco.
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 23 (1987).
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gence of privileged documents. 183 Unlike a negligence standard,
which will produce only those sorts of care that courts examine, 184 a
strict responsibility standard will produce the proper balance be~
tween the various levels of care available. 185 Further, it will encourage parties to innovate, to discover more effective ways of
protecting documents from disclosure. 186 Hence, parties will invest
resources in all cost-effective methods of care, including research and
development of new ones. The relative amounts of such care will depend upon their effectiveness and relative costs. 187 These costs will
include both out-of-pocket costs and agency costs. As agency costs
between attorney and client rise, parties will take proportionately
more care at the segregation and generation stage, where no such
costs exist.
A client could also react to the possibility of strict liability by reducing the overall activity level.188 To be precise, a client could reduce the actual number of documents produced. Such a reduction
could be accomplished in several ways. The client could simply seek
less legal advice, seek legal advice only in oral, rather than in written
form, 189 or destroy relevant documents once the legal advice has
been received.
Hence, the rule of strict responsibility will have several discrete
effects upon the behavior of clients and their attorneys, all of which
represent social costs. First, parties will spend real resources at the
pre-discovery and post-discovery stages, both segregating documents
when they are generated and screening them during production. Second, both parties will invest real resources developing new ways to
protect documents from disclosure. Third, parties may destroy relevant documents after the documents have been generated and have
served their purpose. Such destruction represents both an out-ofpocket and an administrative cost. Firms must pay the actual cost of
destruction and disposal; the firms must devise a system of institutional memory which operates without documents. This will make it
more difficult for firms to hire employees for short periods of
183. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 141, 145-47 and accompanying text.
185. SeeS. SHAVELL, supra note 182, at 17.
186. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 367 (1988).
187. S. SHAVELL, supra note 182, at 9.
188. See R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 161; W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note
181, at 66; S. SHA YELL, supra note 182, at 21-26.
189. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 362 (stating that "[i)f certain writings are discoverable, people may find ways to carry on their business orally or in
code").
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time. 19 Firms will be forced to prefer long-term workers who
"know the score" without the need to consult documents produced by
their predecessors.
Fourth, parties will reduce the number of documents produced
and reduce the amount of legal advice sought or shift their communications to an oral form. Such a shift will result in more legal violations and more litigation as parties receive less exact legal advice. 191
Reliance on oral communications will again bias the labor market toward long-term employees as firms rely on human institutional
memories. The use of oral communications may also make parties
take fewer risks. Fifth, such a rule will certainly encourage the opponents of producing parties to increase the size of their discovery requests, because such requests will impose even greater costs than
usual upon producing parties.192
CONDUCT APPROACH

Effects of a Well-Defined Standard
The effect of a reasonable precautions approach upon clients invoking the privilege depends pivotally upon the way in which the
standard is administered. 193 Under a properly administered reasonable precautions approach, courts examine each and every contemplated decision by a firm and determine whether it is cost justified. 194
Such a system would involve examining both the amount of activity
conducted and the care taken given such conduct. 195 However, courts
are generally not competent to evaluate activity levels. 196 Hence, in
asking whether a car driver was negligent, courts do not ask whether
the driver drove the car too much in comparison to the benefits derived from that driving. Instead, courts ask, given that the driver
drove, did the driver do so reasonably. 197 Similarly, courts in the implied waiver context do not consider activity level; they do not ask
whether the producing party generated too many documents while
consulting its attorney before litigation. Instead, courts take the activity level as given and examine the level of care. In this context,
190. I owe this idea to Nancy Goodman, a student at the University of Chicago Law
School.
191. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
192. See Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U.L. REV. 569, 581-84 (1989).
193. S. SHA VELL, supra note 182, at 83.
194. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 66-67; S. SHAVELL, supra note 182,
at 9, 17.
195. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
196. R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 161.
197. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 66-67 n.22; S. SHAVELL, supra
note 182, at 6; R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 161.

1990]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

539

courts ask whether parties took reasonable care. As noted above,
such a determination involves comparing the cost of precautions (B)
with the reduction in harm which the precautions bring about. More
precisely, courts ask whether, at the margin, the cost of additional
care equals the reduction in expected accident costs (P*L). 198 Hence,
parties take due care when:
+dB=-dPL
Any more care would be inefficient, because it would induce too
small a decrease in ·the expected value of accidents. Less care would
be inefficient. Society could reduce accidents by more than the cost
of additional care.199
To apply this formula, a court needs some idea of what the potential harm is. As the earlier discussion shows, the benefits of care
are unclear. 200 Or, to put it another way, what type of injury does
the producing party hope to avoid by taking care? There is no external injury to society from the release of a document. The only harm
caused by such a release is the harm to the producing party itself.
Such harm is represented by the increased expected value of a judgment (J) against the producing party which results from the new evidence which the producing party has inadvertently placed before the
tribunal. Given this analysis, the above formula for determining
whether the producing party took due care evolves into:
+dB=-d(PJ)D. 201
To determine whether a party has taken due care, a court must balance the marginal cost of that care against the marginal increase in
the expected value of a judgment against the producing party.
Assuming that a court is able to gather the information necessary to determine the proper level of care to be taken in the docu198. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge
Learned Hand wrote:
[T]he owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting
injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will
break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden
of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to
state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the
burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P.
Id. See Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982). See generally
W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 96-107 (arguing [with copious citations and
analysis] that courts have traditionally applied "the Hand formula" to negligence
problems).
199. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972).
200. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
201. Where Pi is the Probability of Judgment and D is the amount of damages
flowing from that judgment.
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ment production and generation process, what effects will such a rule
have? First, parties will spend real resources at the generation and
production stage in an attempt to meet the standard set by the court.
This will involve document segregation programs and various screening procedures at the production stage. Second, unlike a rule of strict
responsibility, a reasonable precautions approach will not encourage
the development of new screening procedures. 202 Courts will merely
define reasonable precautions in terms of known technology and
methods. Third, a properly defined negligence rule will have no direct effect upon the activity level of the firm. 203 The client will produce the same number of privileged documents as he would have
produced under a subjective intent rule. Hence, a negligence standard will not directly decrease the information flow between attorney and client. Therefore, the rule of law values behind the privilege
will not suffer. Such a rule, however, may have small wealth effects.
Specifically, when parties spend real resources on care, their aggregate wealth will drop when compared to that which would exist
under a subjective intent regime. When such wealth drops, we can
expect a corresponding decrease in document generation. While this
effect is real, it will probably be quite small, because the costs of segregating and screening documents are quite small compared to the
aggregate wealth of firms.

Effects of a Poorly-Defined Standard
In our imperfect world, of course, the application of such a standard is exceptionally difficult. Specifically, courts are probably quite
unable to determine the costs and benefits of relevant care. This
problem may take several forms.
One problem is that of sequential care. As noted several times,
parties can take care at both the generation and production stages.
Given these two loci of care, one would expect a court to examine the
care taken at both levels in order to determine whether the producing party took reasonable precautions. Some courts examine such
precautions,204 but this is not always the case. As is the case in negligence law generally, 205 courts very often ignore care taken at the
generation level, instead focusing upon the amount of care taken at
202. See supra note 54-79 and accompanying text.
203. Recall that we have assumed that courts take activity levels as given.
204. Prebilt Corp. v. Preway, Inc., No. 87-7132 at 7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Ranney-Brown Distribs., Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (S.D. Ohio 1977); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co.,
15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
205. S. Shavell, supra note 182, at 9, 17.
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the production level. 206 If parties know that courts will ignore the
care taken at the generation level, they will cease taking care at that
level. 207 Instead, they will focus all their energy upon taking the
legally-mandated precautions at the production level. At first glance
this does not seem right. Surely the first unit of care at the generation level will yield greater benefits (in the form of fewer releases)
than the last unit of care employed at the production stage.208 A
party seeking to protect its interests would certainly invest some of
its limited resources in pre-production segregation, instead of using
all those resources at the production screening stage.
True, proper precautions would involve care at both levels. Yet,
if a court only scrutinizes one level, requiring a particular level of
care, a party would be wasting its resources by taking care earlier. In
other words, it would be in a party's best interest to meet the production level standard and ignore care at the generation level. 209 Once it
has met the production level standard, a party will never be said to
have waived the privilege, and hence care at the earlier level would
be duplicative.
A second similar problem is a misdefinition of the proper
amount of care at either level. For instance, courts may set the standard too low, requiring too little screening at the production level, or
too little segregation at the production level. When this is the case,
parties will simply reduce their expenditures on care accordingly.
They will take no more care than is necessary to satisfy the rule,
knowing that satisfaction of the rule will nullify all chance of potential waiver. 210 Given the conclusion that there is no reason for any
care in the first place, such a result would be a happy one, at least
compared to a "properly-designed" standard of care because such a
standard would involve a smaller waste of real resources.
On the other side of the coin, courts may set the standard of care
too high. They may require all sorts of precautions which, from the
perspective of the producing party, only marginally reduce the ex206. Kanter v. Superior Court, 206 Cal App. 3d 803, 253 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1988); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12 (D. Neb. 1985); Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 392, 522 N.Y.S.2d 999
(1987).
207. S. SHA VELL, supra note 182, at 9.
208. This is simply an application of the principle of diminishing marginal productivity. See P. WONNACO'IT & R. WONNACOTT, ECONOMICS 665-66 (2d ed. 1982).
209. S. SHAVELL, supra note 182, at 9, 17. C.f. Developments in the Law, New York
Recognizes an Exception to Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege for Fraudulent Voluntary Disclosure of Privileged Documents, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 752, 758 (1985) (suggesting that factors considered in any reasonable precautions test will, in effect,
become a standard of conduct for the bar).
210. S. SHA VELL, supra note 182, at 83; W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 182, at
124.
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pected values of judgments. Such an outcome will produce results
which mimic those obtained under a strict responsibility approach. 211
Because the cost of reaching the standard would be too high, parties
will react by taking only a cost-justified level of care. Even given this
level of care, parties will still be found lacking from a precautions
standpoint. Hence, they will waive the privilege with respect to any
document produced. Given this situation, parties will move to a
lower activity level, reducing the number of documents generated in
the first place. Such a reduction will have the same negative consequences for the production of information and the rule of law as the
adoption of a strict responsibility standard.

Strategic Behavior
A final by-product of a conduct standard is strategic behavior.
Earlier we noted that a strict liability rule would encourage receiving
parties to abuse the discovery process.212 Specifically, such a rule
would encourage receiving parties to make large discovery requests
upon the producing party, in the hope of imposing costs in the form
of released documents and screening costs. A negligence rule will
have similar but more expansive effects. Not only will receiving parties have an incentive to request more documents, producing parties
will want to produce more. As noted earlier, 213 courts often measure
the reasonableness of precautions indirectly, to wit, by counting the
number of documents actually produced. Hence, the higher the proportion of privileged to non-privileged documents produced, the
greater the chance that precautions will be said to be unreasonable.
A producing party facing such a rule has an obvious incentive to
overproduce non-privileged documents so as to decrease this ratio.
Such overproduction imposes costs on the adversary process, as producing parties spend time amassing irrelevant, non-privileged documents and receiving parties wade through those documents.
CONCLUSION
The attorney-client privilege is a type of property right which
encourages the production of useful information, facilitating the rule
of law. The privilege is especially important at the planning stage,
before litigation takes place. At this stage, parties must have the liberty of exchanging information with their attorneys in order to know
the law and abide by it. This is especially so for a large corporation
211. See W. LANDER & R. POSNER, supra note 182, at 124-25 (setting negligence
standard too high is equivalent to a strict liability standard).
212. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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governed by complex rules in the pervasively regulated administrative state.
Against this background, the doctrine of inadvertent waiver
makes little sense. As in other areas of property law, the waiver of a
right should be reserved for those cases in which a party makes a
knowing, objective decision to do so. Most courts, however, have not
adopted this approach. Instead, most courts have adopted either a
strict responsibility approach or a conduct approach.
This Article has demonstrated that the adoption of such standards is misguided. Specifically, these standards impose social costs
without corresponding benefits. Under a strict responsibility standard, parties will both take care and reduce their level of document
generation. This will create two sorts of social costs: resources will
be spent on care and parties will receive less effective legal advice.
The first result is simply wasteful; the second is in direct derogation
of the purposes of the privilege. A conduct standard which forces
parties to make prompt objections to released documents is misguided. It forces the producing party to guard against unjustified reliance which the receiving party could easily avoid. A properly
defined and administered conduct standard will force parties to spend
real resources to guard against the production of documents and result in strategic behavior. Unlike a strict responsibility standard,
which reduces the flow of information between attorney and client,
the conduct approach does not impact adversely on the rule of law; it
is simply wasteful. Producing parties spend real resources to guard
against production without any corresponding social benefit. A legal
system which seeks to minimize social costs and facilitate the flow of
information between attorney and client, fostering the rule of law,
should not stray from the traditional notion of waiver.

